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ABSTRACT REY CA 93943-5101
In an era when mines are inexpensive and easily accessible, present mine detection
and area reconnaissance capabilities are insufficient to enable unencumbered maneuver in
the littoral regions. Unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) possess potential to provide
tactical commanders with full understanding of the mine threat without risk to ships or
personnel and without exposing intentions. By integrating an assortment of emerging
capabilities, a system comprised of a variety of UUVs could address this mine threat. This
thesis develops and implements the Mine Reconnaissance System Assessment (MiRSA)
model, a mixed integer-linear program, to assign a mix of UUVs to search areas within a
suspected minefield. Using unclassified UUV performance estimates, this thesis
compares combinations of two Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS)
vehicles, six Remote Environmental Monitoring Units (REMUS) vehicles, and a notional
Manta vehicle. For a 262 square nautical mile area in the Straits of Hormuz, MiRSA finds
the two LMRS vehicles can complete a 95% confidence level search in 91 hours, the
Manta vehicle can complete the search in 130 hours, and the two LMRS vehicles with
Manta employed optimally together require only 52 hours. For an exhaustive search,
times rise sharply: Manta operating alone requires 1,004 hours and optimal employment of
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In an era when mines are inexpensive and easily accessible, present mine detection
and area reconnaissance capabilities are insufficient to enable unencumbered maneuver in
the littoral regions. Unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) possess potential to provide
tactical commanders with full understanding of the mine threat without risk to ships or
personnel and without exposing intentions. By integrating an assortment of emerging
capabilities, a system comprised of a variety of UUVs could address this mine threat.
Recent UUV employment studies focus primarily on developing a specific UUV
architecture (i.e., selection of sensors, power sources, communication systems, and
navigation systems). These studies use simulation-based tools to evaluate the
performance of UUV architectures, to help identify preferred UUV architectures, and to
specify performance characteristics. The analysis in this thesis differs from previous
efforts by using optimization to assign a variety of UUVs working together to conduct
mine detection operations.
This thesis develops and implements the Mine Reconnaissance System Assessment
(MiRSA) model. MiRSA is a mixed integer-linear program that assigns UUVs to search
areas within a suspected minefield. Using unclassified UUV architectures, MiRSA
evaluates combinations of two Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) vehicles,
six Remote Environmental Monitoring Units (REMUS) vehicles, and a notional Manta
vehicle searching 262 square nautical miles in the Straits of Hormuz.
MiRSA finds two LMRS vehicles can complete a 95% confidence level search of
the Straits of Hormuz in 91 hours and the Manta vehicle requires 130 hours. If two
XV
vehicle architectures are available, the two LMRS vehicles with Manta employed together
require only 52 hours. When only the LRMS or the Manta is to be operated with the
REMUS vehicles, MiRSA finds the LMRS and REMUS combined system requires 78
hours and the Manta and REMUS combined system requires 100 hours. Employing two
LMRS vehicles, six REMUS vehicles, and Manta together finish the search in 47 hours.
For an exhaustive search, mission times rise sharply. Two LMRS vehicles require
794 hours while the Manta vehicle requires 1,004 hours. The two LMRS vehicles with
Manta employed together require only 436 hours. Employing two LMRS vehicles with
REMUS requires 644 hours, the Manta vehicle with REMUS requires 780 hours, and all
three UUV architectures finish the search in 384 hours.
The value of a mixed integer-linear programming approach is twofold. The
MiRSA model provides a tool for rapidly assessing the benefit of employing combinations
of UUV architectures. In addition, for a specific scenario and UUV characteristics,
MiRSA model results provide tactical commanders with a decision-aid for assigning
UUVs to mine detection operations.
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Unmanned undersea vehicle performance parameters included in this thesis are




In an era when mines are inexpensive and easily accessible, present mine detection
and area reconnaissance capabilities are insufficient to enable unencumbered maneuver in
the littoral regions. Unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) possess potential to provide
tactical commanders with full understanding of the mine threat without risk to ships or
personnel and without exposing intentions. By integrating an assortment of emerging
capabilities, a system comprised of a variety of UUVs could address this mine threat.
Using unclassified UUV performance estimates, this thesis develops and implements the
Mine Reconnaissance System Assessment (MiRSA) model, a mixed integer-linear
program, to assign a mix of UUVs to search areas within a suspected minefield. This
thesis compares combinations of two Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS)
vehicles, six Remote Environmental Monitoring Units (REMUS) vehicles, and a notional
Manta vehicle searching a 262 square nautical mile area in the Straits of Hormuz.
A. BACKGROUND
Now that the cold war has ended, the absence of a competing superpower and the
emerging threat from smaller second and third world countries present the U.S. Navy with
the challenge of shifting strategy from dominance of the open ocean to mastery of the
littorals (Bovio 1999). Although the nature of the enemy has changed, the ability to
project power ashore with overwhelming tempo, momentum, and sustainable forces from
the sea remains a central aim of the Navy and Marine Corps. Operational Maneuver from
the Sea (U.S. Marine Corps 1996) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (Blaisol 1997) reflect
this evolution of amphibious warfare and power projection in littoral waters.
Developing nations, unable to maintain a large naval force, use mines as a low
cost, effective counter to western power projection. During the Gulf War Conflict, in a
period of three hours and merely ten nautical miles apart, the USS TRIPOLI (LPH-10) and
the USS PRINCETON (CG-59) struck mines in the northern Arabian Gulf. The USS
TRIPOLI sustained a 16-foot by 20-foot hole in her starboard side below the waterline
(Figure 1). USS PRINCETON, able to maintain only half power, suffering from a cracked
superstructure and a jammed port rudder, limped back to port under tow from the USS
BEAUFORT (Naval Historical Center 1991). An Associated Press article states "Mines
that Iraq planted in the sea during the Persian Gulf War nearly split the cruiser USS
Princeton in half and held an American amphibious assault force at bay. Iraq, the




Figure 1. Mine Damage to USS Tripoli (LPH-10)
In Operation Desert Storm, the USS Tripoli struck a mine resulting in 16 x 20 foot hole. Easily
attainable, capable of being deployed from the air, surface vessels, or from submarines, mines can
be employed effectively to deny access through key sea-lanes and severely hamper operational
maneuver. With growing doctrinal emphases on littoral operations, new approaches to mine
countermeasures are needed to prevent this from happening in the future. [Source: U.S. Naval
Institute Press 19911
Pentagon learned, was better at laying mines than the U.S. Navy was at clearing them
(Associated Press 1998)."
The full spectrum of mine countermeasure (MCM) operations involves detection,
classification, localization, and neutralization of mines. "Present and near-term mine
detection and area reconnaissance capabilities are insufficient to assure the absence of
mines and therefore to enable unencumbered maneuver (Pollitt 1998)." As the
workhorses of the Navy's current surface mine-hunting capabilities, the Avenger (MCM
1) and Osprey (MHC 51) class ships are equipped with mine-hunting sonar and remotely
operated mine neutralization systems (Figure 2). In addition, Avenger class vessels also
possess mechanical sweep equipment, and magnetic and acoustic influence sweeping
equipment, that must be towed at a "safe" distance behind the ship in hopes of
* **
Figure 2. Avenger and Osprey Class Mine Countermeasure Vessels
Mine countermeasure (MCM) operations include detection, classification, localization, and neutralization of
mines. Equipped with mine-hunting sonar and the remotely operated mine-hunting system, the Avenger
(MCM 1) class [Source: U.S. Naval Institute Press 1987] and the Osprey (MHC 51) class [Source: U.S.
Naval Institute Press 1991] mine-hunting vessels are the U. S. Navy's premiere mine hunters. Battlegroup
commanders must wait for these costly vessels to arrive in theater before MCM operations can proceed.
Additionally, MCM operations must be conducted within the suspected minefield area placing these ships
and their crews at risk. The U.S. Navy proposes placing UUVs aboard non-MCM platforms to provide the
flexibility for on-the-spot and on-demand MCM capabilities.
actuating mines. With this capability, these ships bear the brunt of the MCM effort. This
effort requires them to pass through suspected minefield areas, placing them at risk.
Furthermore, overt MCM operations in shallow waters alert the enemy of intentions,
enabling them to prepare for the arrival of assaulting forces.
The U.S. Naval Mine Warfare Plan states "Mine reconnaissance is the Navy's
highest mine warfare objective as well as the top unmanned undersea vehicle priority.
Knowledge of the full dimension of the mine threat without exposing the reconnaissance
platforms and the intentions of the tactical commander is vital to littoral warfare (Mine
Warfare Command 1996)." Currently, studies sponsored by the Office of Naval Research,
Mine Warfare Command and Naval Undersea Warfare Center investigate the transfer of
technology in UUVs to mine-hunting capabilities. The Navy plans to build its first mine-
hunting UUV in the form of the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) with
production to begin in 2003 (Castelli 1999).
B. THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter II reviews some previous studies on the development of UUVs for use in
mine-hunting operations. Chapter III discusses the partitioning of a suspected minefield
area into search zones and introduces the use of elemental search area assignment of
UUVs. Chapter IV presents the MiRSA mixed integer-linear program for assigning
UUVs to elemental search areas. Chapter V details MiRSA model input calculations and
discusses MiRSA model results. Chapter VI provides conclusions.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Recent unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV) employment studies focus primarily on
developing a specific UUV architecture (i.e. selection of sensors, power sources,
communication systems, and navigation systems). These studies use simulation-based
tools to evaluate the performance of UUVs, to identify preferred UUV architectures, and
to specify performance characteristics. Below we review some of these studies.
A. MINE COUNTERMEASURES ACCELERATED CAPABILITIES
In a joint multi-laboratory study, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory and the Navy Surface Warfare Center/Coastal Systems Station propose
employing clandestine surveillance UUVs along with bottom emplaced sensors in areas of
interest. The Mine Countermeasures Accelerated Capabilities Initiative System Study
"...constructs an integrated system by identifying requirements, projecting future
capabilities, and noting shortfalls (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
and Naval Surface Warfare Center/Coastal Systems Station 1996)."
This study reports the UUV surveillance role is achievable with current and
projected near-term UUV capabilities. However, this study also finds that the
development of reconnaissance UUVs poses considerable technical challenges.
Limitations in power sources, computer aided detection, classification, and identification
algorithms, and navigation systems complicate development of a capable reconnaissance
UUV. Despite these limitations, the study concludes that use of clandestine UUVs can
reduce the length of overt MCM efforts, and thereby reduce enemy reaction time to an
amphibious landing. (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and Naval
Surface Warfare Center/Coastal Systems Station 1 996)
This study employs an object-oriented, Monte Carlo based, event driven
simulation to evaluate vehicle design performance. The simulation mimics the movement
of MCM assets and amphibious forces as well as the interaction between MCM ships and
mines using probabilistic detection and actuation widths. Furthermore, simulation of the
interaction between amphibious assault craft and remaining mines determines losses.
(Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and Naval Surface Warfare
Center/Coastal Systems Station 1996)
B. LMRS COST AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory's cost and operational
effectiveness analysis of the LMRS evaluates the cost-effectiveness of alternative
submarine-launched UUV configurations for conducting clandestine mine reconnaissance,
narrows the field of potential alternative architectures, and identifies necessary
performance parameters. (Benedict 1996)
From a selection of over 150 different UUVs, the study recommends seven
alternative solutions. On the basis of the study's recommendation, Oversight Board co-
chairs agree that the LMRS should possess the following characteristics:
"1. 21
-inch diameter by 240-inch long autonomous UUV,
2. Torpedo-tube-launched and recovered,
3
.
Radio frequency and/or acoustic communications capable,
4. Replaceable energy source (safe to conduct aboard a submarine),
5. Forward-looking and side-looking classification sonar,
6. Single-sortie reach of 75-125 nautical miles,
7. Total area coverage of 400-650 square nautical miles/mission, and
8. Area coverage rate of 35-50 square nautical miles/day (Benedict 1996)."
The study's primarily focuses on varied sensor types, energy systems, tethered
versus untethered systems, storage, and launch and recovery methods. Additionally, the
study includes several secondary considerations including trade-offs among maximum and
minimum operating depths, navigation capabilities, noise signature, speed, and
communication systems. (Benedict 1996)
Analysis of alternatives involves three levels of modeling: mission level analysis,
analysis of individual UUV architectures, and acoustic performance analysis. Mission
level analysis employs a Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate various individual UUV
architectures. The model simulates a particular UUV's ability to select mine-free transit
lanes in seventeen representative tactical situations. Among the tactical situations, the
simulation includes the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the Straits of Hormuz. The
model also considers the effect of varied levels of clutter (non-mine objects) in evaluating
UUV performance. (Benedict 1 996)
Benedict (1996) also reports their use of spreadsheets to help evaluate specific
UUV design measures of effectiveness that are independent of clutter levels. Evaluation
of vehicle sortie reach, total area coverage and area coverage rate possible with varied
power source limitations, electrical loads, sensor performance, and navigation and
communication capabilities help to eliminate some UUV architectures.
Sensor performance analysis employs physics-based acoustic raytrace models to
assess the signal-to-noise ratio versus range of sensor systems in particular environments.
Signal-to-noise ratio data relates probabilities of detection based upon receiver-operator-
characteristic curves. The results from these models provide the necessary sensor
performance parameters for the unit and mission level analysis. (Benedict 1996)
C. SUMMARY
Recent studies explore the benefit of developing mine-hunting UUVs and provide
the unclassified performance estimates for use in the MiRSA model. This thesis differs
from previous efforts by considering a variety ofUUV architectures and using
optimization to assign them to mine detection operations.
III. SEARCHING A SUSPECTED MINEFIELD USING UNMANNED
UNDERSEA VEHICLES
Although the Avenger and Osprey class ships are capable of conducting mine
countermeasure operations in depths as shallow as 30 feet, such operations near shore
expose them to shore batteries. In future concepts of operations, UUVs could be
employed in advance of a planned amphibious operation to conduct intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in areas very near shore (in depths as shallow
as 10 feet). Designed to be platform independent and capable of being launched and
operated by any ship in theater, UUVs may provide commanders with an on-demand,
ship-borne mine-hunting capability. However, UUVs are still in the development stages
as designers seek to exploit current and future technologies in the areas of navigation,
endurance, communication systems, computer-aided detection, and computer-aided
classification systems. The discussion below describes the issue of how a system of
UUVs may be employed to search a suspected minefield.
A. TECHNOLOGY TRADE-OFFS AND CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION
Development of UUVs will enable clandestine intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, mapping, mine searching, identification, and neutralization of coastal
waters. Because there is a wide diversity of mine types and there are UUV technology
limitations, it is unlikely that a single class of UUVs will be able to perform all mine
countermeasure missions (Pollitt 1998). By integrating an assortment of capabilities, a
system comprised of a variety of general-purpose, mine-hunting, and expendable mine
neutralizing UUVs is better suited to the diversity of ocean environments and mine types




















Figure 3. Remote Environmental Monitoring Units (REMUS) UUV
Only 52 inches long and body diameter of 7.5 inches, the REMUS weighs 68 pounds and may be
trimmed for operations in fresh or salt water. Its small size, light weight, and reconfigurable design
make it possible to be launched from small vessels with little support. Currently, REMUS is a
developmental tool of the Oceanographic Systems Lab of the Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution, funded by National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration and National
Undersea Research Program. However, it can easily be adapted to perform the MCM mission.
[Source: Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution 1999]
vehicle is one of several UUVs under development that might be adapted for mine-hunting
operations (Figure 3). Equipped with a high-resolution sonar sensor, the REMUS vehicle
is capable of taking near photographic-quality images of the ocean floor.
B. SEARCH ZONES (SZ) AND ELEMENTAL SEARCH AREA (ESA)
ASSIGNMENT
When clearing a suspected minefield area (SMA), conceptual search zones (SZs)
running parallel to the shoreline partition the area into contiguous parcels of ocean that
possess similar characteristics such as depth, bottom type, acoustic environment, and the
type of mines expected (Figure 4). An elemental search area (ESA) for a UUV is the
maximum area it can search to a specified confidence level before having to return to its
host platform to recharge its batteries. The search level, defined as the percentage of area
physically surveyed by the UUVs sensors, determines the confidence level as defined in
(Pollitt 1999a). Assuming a uniform [0,100] mine distribution and using the methods
described in Pollitt (1999a), the confidence level is the cumulative probability that no
more than two mines exist in the SMA if no mines are detected. The width of the ESA














Figure 4. Partitioning of Suspected Minefield Areas (SMAs) into Search Zones
Partitioning a suspected minefield area into parallel search zones (SZs) divides the ocean into parcels
that possess similar oceanographic characteristics such as depth, bottom type, and other acoustic
properties. Unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) conduct searches within these SZs to a specified
probability that no more than two mines remain undetected. An elemental search area (ESA), a
rectangle above, is the maximum area a UUV can search to a specified probability before having to
return to its host platform to recharge its batteries. The width of an ESA (esawidth) varies according
to the UUV, search zone, and host platform standoff distance.
II
Within these ESAs, UUVs conduct a ladder search with sufficient search lane
separation and sensor width overlap to ensure a specified confidence level. A UUV
conducts a ladder search by traversing parallel tracks or search lanes to form a ladder-like
pattern. Each search lane is a single pass within the ESA. The search lane separation
defines the spacing between each search lane (Figure 5). For this study, 95 percent is a
good initial assessment for confidence level (Pollitt 1999a). The sum of the ESA widths
for all assigned UUVs must span the entire width of the SZ. Because searches typically
follow a "march-to-the-beach" fashion, UUVs assigned searches in multiple SZs conduct
their searches from the seaward SZs first and progress toward the initial craft landing site
as each SZ search is completed.
Indices:
z - Suspected Minefield Area zone




«dh 4 launch platform
Figure 5. Elemental Search Area (ESA)
UUV searches divide the search zone (SZ) into ESAs. The endurance of the UUV, sensor
performance within the SZ, and the standoff distance of the host ship from the ESA determine ESA
width. Within the ESA, UUVs conduct a ladder search to a specified probability that no more than
two mines exist in the suspected minefield area given that none are detected. Each vertical pass
within the ESA is a search lane and the horizontal spacing between search lanes is the search lane
separation.
12
C. SUSPECTED MINEFIELD AREA MISSION TIME (SMAMT)
The ESA time is defined as the time required for a UUV to complete its search
within an assigned ESA. For each UUV, the sum of the ESA times for all assigned ESAs
in previous and current SZs determine the time needed to complete its searches through
the current SZ. The longest time among all UUVs is the SZ completion time (SZCT). The
SMA mission time (SMAMT) is the time required to search the entire SMA. Times for
launching, recovering, transiting, and recharging UUVs determine the full ESA times.
Some scenarios exist when full ESA times may be discounted. For example, UUVs
assigned to the last ESA in a SZ need not consider the return transit provided appropriate
communications are available.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter introduces the conceptual division of an SMA into ESAs. The size of
an ESA depends on the UUV, the standoff distance of the host platform, the search zone,
and the desired confidence level. The next chapter contains the MiRSA model for
assigning UUVs to ESAs.
13
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.
14
IV. MINE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT
(MiRSA) MODEL
The Mine Reconnaissance System Assessment (MiRSA) model, a mixed integer-
linear program, assigns UUVs to search areas for mine-hunting. There are two versions of
MiRSA. The first assumes that each ESA has fixed area for a given UUV within a
specific SZ. The second allows each ESA to have variable width. This thesis develops
both versions because it is uncertain that UUV technology will allow precise navigation of
ESAs with variable widths.
A. FIXED-SIZE ELEMENTAL SEARCH AREA (ESA) MiRSA MODEL
1. Problem Definition
Given a fixed number of host platforms available near shore, each with a variety of
UUVs, an SMA of fixed length and width is to be surveyed in the least amount of time.
MiRSA determines the number of fixed-size ESAs assigned to each UUV. The ESA
width corresponds to a specified search level and a desired confidence level. The search
level is the percentage of area physically surveyed by the UUVs sensors and it determines
the confidence level. The confidence level is the probability that no more than two mines
exist in the area searched if no mines are detected.
2. Assumptions
The ESA width for a given UUV and SZ is constant. Asserting a long standoff
distance compared to ESA widths ensures that transit distances remain fairly uniform for a
specific vehicle throughout a given SZ. Other simplifying assumptions include constant
UUV performance for a given SZ and allowed simultaneous UUV launches. MiRSA
15
therefore, does not consider how UUV performance varies over the course of a day in
response to weather, sea-state, and tidal changes. MiRSA also ignores the small
additional time associated with scheduling UUV launches and recoveries when
simultaneous launches and recoveries of multiple UUVs are not possible. This additional




SZ of an SMA partitioned according to similar geographic characteristics
such as bottom depth, bottom type, salinity, and distance from shore
v vehicle serial number, defining the type ofUUV and host ship
4. Data
esastzv ESA setup time (time required to launch, transit to and from the SZ,
recovery, and recharge) [hours]
etotitl2v the search time for UUV v in SZ z in one ESA [hours]
sesastZy shortened ESA setup time (does not include battery recharge time and
recovery time) for last ESA of vehicle v to zone z or for vehicles equipped
with real time communications systems [hours]
esawidthzy width ofESA searched in SZ z by vehicle v [yards]
szwidth; width of SZ z [yards]
5. Variables
SMAMT total mission time from launch of first vehicle to search completion [hours]
SZCT: cumulative mission time required to search SZ z and all lower numbered
SZs [hours]
ESASz,v number of complete ESAs performed by vehicle v within SZ z
16




SMAMT >SZCT Vz (4.1)
SZCT: >YJ (^astz;v + etotith\v)(ESASz', v + SESAz-.v)
z'<z
+ (esast2,v + etotith,v)(ESASz,v) Vz,v (4.2)
+ (sesastz, v + etotitlz, v)(SESAz, v)
Y,esawidth:,v(ESAS:.v + SESAz, v) > szwidthz Vz (4.3)
SMAMT > (4.4)
SZCTz>0 Vz (4.5)
ESASz,v>0 and Integer Vz,v (4.6)
SE£4*.» e {0,1} Vz,v (4.7)
Equation (4.1) and the objective function ensure time to search the entire SMA is
the maximum time required to search any SZ. In equation (4.2), for each UUV, the time
needed to complete searches in any SZ includes the UUV's time in lower numbered zones.
Equation (4.3) ensures complete area coverage of each SZ. Equations (4.4) to (4.7)
respectively declare variables as non-negative, non-negative integer and binary.
B. VARIABLE-SIZE ELEMENTAL SEARCH AREA (ESA) MiRSA MODEL
1. Additional Variables
This version of MiRSA uses the same variables as the fixed-size ESA MiRSA
model and the following additional variable:
CESAS:
,





SMAMT > SZCT-. Vz (4.8)
SZCTz > J][(esast:: v)(ESAS:^ + SESA::v)
z'<z
+ (etotith v)(CESAz',v)] Vzv (49)




v{CESASz,,) > szwidthz Vz (4.10)
V
CESASz, v < ESASz,, + SESAz,. Vz,v (4.11)
SMAMT > (4.12)
SZCTz > Vz (4.13)
CESASr.v > Vz,v (4.14)
£&4&,v > and Integer Vz,v (4.15)
SESAz, v e {0,1} Vz,v (4.16)
Equation (4.8) is the same as equation (4.1). Equation (4.9) is the same as
equation (4.2) except search times vary for the variable-size ESA widths. Equation (4.10)
ensures area coverage of the entire SZ. Equation (4.1 1) ensures the number of CESAS:x
assigned does not exceed the number of fixed-size ESAs assigned. Equations (4.12) to
(4.16) respectively declare variables as non-negative, non-negative integer and binary.
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V. ELEMENTAL SEARCH AREA CALCULATIONS AND
MiRSA RESULTS
This chapter applies the concept of dividing an SMA into SZs and ESAs for a
hypothetical tactical situation in the Straits of Hormuz. It describes the preliminary
calculation of ESA parameters needed to implement MiRSA, discusses specific UUV
characteristics, and details the varied combinations of UUVs investigated. Finally, it
reports both fixed-size and variable-size ESA MiRSA model results for the hypothetical
situation.
A. SUSPECTED MINEFIELD AREA (SMA) DEFINITION
A Straits of Hormuz tactical situation builds upon earlier studies evaluating
individual UUV architecture performance in the Straits of Hormuz. A Defense Mapping
Agency chart of the Gulf of Oman-Persian Gulf (Defense Mapping Agency and
Hydrographic/Topographic Center 1995) serves as a guide for defining the SMA.
The SMA incorporates the observed traffic separation scheme for incoming and
outgoing ships and extends towards the Iranian coastline. An SMA with twice the width
of the transit lanes allows for greater flexibility in transiting the straits. The entire SMA
spans 262 square nautical miles (nm). Four search zones (SZs) partition the SMA. SZs
one and two are 12.5 nm by 3.25 nm and define the southern entrance to the straits. SZ
three is 20.2 nm by 5 nm and captures the bend in the transit lanes. The fourth SZ is 16
nm by 5 nm. Defining the SZs is arbitrary for the straits because the water depth is
consistently greater than 200 feet. A submarine stationed 12 nm south of the entrance of
the straits serves as the launch platform for the UUVs (Figure 6).
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B. ELEMENTAL SEARCH AREA (ESA) CALCULATIONS
MiRSA uses ESA width (esawidth:v), ESA setup time (esast, v), shorter SESA
setup time (sesastzv), and search time (etotitL v) as input. A spreadsheet generates the
necessary input values based on the desired search level (P), sensor width (AZiV), detection
probability (B:v), battery availability time, transit distance, and search and transit speed for
each UUV and SZ. During operation, UUVs equipped with GPS conduct GPS fix events.




Figure 6. Straits of Hormuz Suspected Minefield Area (SMA)
The Straits of Hormuz serves as the suspected minefield area. Arrows depict the traffic
separation scheme for ships entering and leaving the Persian Gulf. Partitioning divides the
SMA into four search zones (SZs). SZ 1 and SZ 2 are 12.5 nm by 3.25 nm. SZ 3 describes
the bend in the transit zone and is 20.2 nm by 5 nm. SZ 4 is 16 nm by 5 nm. The depth of
the water is consistently greater than 200 feet. A submarine stationed 12 nm south of the
entrance of the straits (not shown above) serves as the launch platform for the UUVs.
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General input characterizing search (Table 1) includes the number of vehicles, the
search level, transit speed, search speeds, and battery information. The spreadsheet uses
these input values to determine preliminary ESA inputs.
Search Level (P) 63.00%
Confidence Level 94.93%
Number of passes
per sensor / path
(J) 1
Number ofsensors
/ path (N) 1
Transit Speed (kts) 6














Table 1. UUV General Input
General information characterizing a search includes search level, confidence level, the number of sensors
assigned per path, and the frequency with which an individual sensor passes over a given path. During
operation, UUVs equipped with GPS conduct GPS fix events. GPS duty cycle time is the amount of time
in minutes spent obtaining GPS fixes for each hour of operation. Launch and recovery, GPS duty cycle,
and transit must all be deducted from battery available time determining the time available for search.
Equation (5.1) determines the necessary search lane separation (dzy) in yards to





necessary search lane separation to achieve a desired search level
[yards]
number of passes performed by a given sensor over a given path
number of sensors dedicated to search a given path
search width of vehicle v in SZ z [yards]
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Bzy detection probability of vehicle v in SZ z
ezy standard deviation of navigational error [yards]
7z,v MCM efficiency obtained from the graph depicted in Figure 7
(Mine Warfare Command 1986) by the ratio of search width and
standard deviation of navigational error (AZiV/eZy) and detection
probability (5- v)
P the desired search level
dz,* = -J'N,.vA*.vB,.,*Yz,*/\dQ.-F) (5.1)
Equation (5.2) determines the transit length in nautical miles of each turn {turnzy)
between search lanes (Pollitt 1999b). The division by 2025.37 converts units from yards
to nautical miles. Table 2 shows the spreadsheet for UUV sensor characteristic input and
resulting search lane separation and turn length output.
Turn Parameters
turnzy transit length of each turn [nm]
dZy necessary search lane separation to achieve a desired search level
[yards]
turn-.,, = dz.vn/ 2« (1/2025 .37) (5.2)
Battery endurance limits search time. For each vehicle and SZ, the time required
to launch, transit to and from the ESA, and to conduct GPS fixes are constant and reduce
the battery time available for search. The estimated time on target in the lap {etotitUy) is
22
Figure 7. MCM Search Efficiency
MCM Efficiency (Y) characterizes the effectiveness of search efforts based on search width (A), detection
probability (B), and standard deviation of navigational error (e). High detection probabilities and search
widths with low standard deviations of navigational error result in highly efficient searches. On the
contrary, low B and A with high e characterize low efficiency searches. [Source: Mine Warfare Command
1986]
defined as the time in hours dedicated to. conducting a ladder search. Equation (5.3)












1 1167 85 25.00 4668 2.00
2 1167 0.85 25.00 46.68 2.00
3 1167 0.85 25.00 46.68 2.00
4 1167 0.85 2500 4668 2.00
Search Zone
Lane Separation
(d) (yds) Turn Length (nm)




Table 2. UUV Sensor Characteristics
The table above shows the spreadsheet for UUV sensor characteristic input and resulting search lane
separation and turn length output. Suspected minefield area geometry and estimates of vehicle sensor
performance are entered into equation (5.1) to determine the necessary search lane separation for a desired
search level.
ETOTITL Parameters
aetotitlzv available search time [hours]
battery avail timev battery endurance ofUUV v [hours]
GPScyclev GPS fix duration per hour of operation for UUV v [minutes]
time required for launching UUV v [hours]
time required for recovering UUV v [hours]
transit distance from launch point to SZ z [nm]





aetotith, v = battery avail timev * (1 - GPScyclev / 60)
- launch timev - recovery timev
- (2 'transit distancez)/tspdv
(5.3)
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Equation (5.4) determines the number of search lanes (lanes:
,
v) in the ladder search
for a given SZ search lane length (szlength:), search speed (sspd^), and aetotitlzy .
Search Lane Parameters
lanes:y number of search lanes (a continuous value) in an ESA performed
by vehicle v in zone z
aetotitLy available search time [hours]
ssp
d
v search speed of vehicle v [nm/hr]
szlengthz length of a single search lane in ladder search [nm]
turnzy transit length of each turn [nm]
lanesz, v = aetotith, v • sspdv /{szlengthz + turn:, v) (5 .4)
Limiting the number of search lanes to an even number ensures the vehicle exits
the ESA on the side it entered. The product of search lane separation and the number of
even search lanes determine the ESA width in yards, for a given UUV in a SZ. Equation
(5.5) describes this relationship.
ESA Search Width Parameters
esawidth:
,
v width of an ESA [yards]
dzy necessary search lane separation to achieve a desired search level
[yards]
laneSz, v number of search lanes (an even integer) in an ESA performed by
vehicle v in zone z
25
esawidth:, v = d: , v lanes-., (5.5)
The ESA setup time accounts for the vehicle's launch, recovery, transit to and
from the SZ, and battery recharge. The amount of time required only for launch and the



































































































Table 3. Summary of Elemental Search Area (ESA) Width Calculations
The "ESA width" is derived from the required search lane separation (See Table 2) and the "Act. Number of
Lanes" possible with the "GPS Adj. ETOTITL". An even number of search lanes in an ESA ensures the
vehicle exits the ESA on the side it entered. "ESA Setup Time" accounts for launch, transit to and from the
search zone (SZ), recovery, and battery recharge. The "SESA Setup Time" is the launch and transit time
only. "GPS Cycle Time" allows for GPS fix events during the "Available ETOTITL". The "GPS Adj.
ETOTITL" is the available time the vehicle can search within the ESA. "ETOTITL" is the time needed to
search the ESA for the specified number of search lanes. For example, in Search Zone 1. an LMRS vehicle
possesses 33.87 hours of available power (See Table 1). After 4.75 hours spent for launch and transiting to
and from the SZ, and 4.85 hours conducting GPS fix events, the time available to search is (33.87-4.75-4.85)
24.27 hours. 24.27 hours supports a ladder search with 20 search lanes (28.45 hours with GPS Cycles). The
resulting ESA width for 20 search lanes with the required search lane separation is 19.70 nautical miles or
39,907.38 yards. The "ESA Setup Time (esast)" is 14.75 hours. The "SESA Setup Time (sesast)" is 2.25
hours. "ESA Time" is 43.20 hours from launch to launch.
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Table 4 summarizes the ESA widths, ESA setup times, SESA setup times, and










ESA width (am) ESA Width (yds)
ESA Setup Time
(exasl ) (hrs) ETOTITL(hrs)
SESA Setup Time






























ESA width (nm) ESA Width (yds)
ESA Setup Time
(esast) (hrs) ETOTITL (hrs)
SESA Setup Time






























ESA width (nm) ESA Width (yds)
ESA Setup Time
(cms*) (hrs) ETOTITL (hrs)
SESA Setup Time

























Table 4. Summary of Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Elemental Search Area (ESA) Widths
For the 63% search level, a spreadsheet calculates "ESA width", "ESA Setup Time (esast)", "SESA Setup
Time (sesasty\ and "ETOTITL" (MiRSA inputs) for each vehicle and for each SZ in the Straits of Hormuz.
These ESA values depend on the geometry of the search zone, UUV sensor characteristics, battery
endurance, and transit distance. For example, in Search Zone 1, the "ESA width" for six REMUS vehicles is
2.75 nm or 5,576.05 yards. Transiting to and from the ESA and recharging batteries requires 12.25 hours.
Time dedicated to conducting a search is 2.89 hours. The time between launches of a REMUS vehicle is
15.14 hours. A short time ESA requires 4.25 hours for setup plus 2.89 hours for an ESA search. Because
the REMUS vehicles lack the endurance to reach and search distant zones, REMUS' "ETOTITL" and "ESA
width" are zero in Search Zones 3 and 4.
C. VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS
Benedict (1996) describes the LMRS system as consisting of two independent
autonomous vehicles. Each vehicle is a 21 -inch by 240-inch, torpedo-tube-launched
UUV. It comes equipped with a replaceable or rechargeable energy section capable of
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approximately 34 operational hours without replenishment. Battery replacement or
recharge time is approximately 10 hours. The sensor suite includes a forward-looking
search sonar system having a sensor width of 1 167 yards and an associated probability of
detecting bottom mines of 85%. Equipped with GPS navigation and periodic radio
frequency communications, the LMRS can communicate search area survey findings to
tactical commanders at regular intervals. Estimated GPS cycles require approximately 10
minutes for every hour of operation. The LMRS vehicle requires approximately 10
minutes to launch. Recovery of the LMRS requires about 30 minutes.
The Remote Environmental Monitoring Units (REMUS) is a relatively inexpensive
UUV. Modeling a system of six vehicles operating as a single entity widens the search
lane separation while still maintaining a reasonably high search level. The vehicle is 7.5
inches by 52 inches long and weighs only 68 pounds. Because of its small size and
simplicity of design, launch and recovery is simple. However, its compactness presents
limitations in energy and search capability with only 14 hours available battery time, a
mere 400-yard search width, and associated 70% probability of detection from its side-
looking high-resolution sonar suite. The REMUS possesses no GPS or communications
systems capability. Launch time takes 15 minutes with essentially no time required for
recovery. The battery recharges in approximately four hours. (Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution 1 999)
Finally, this study includes a notional Manta vehicle. The Manta' s performance
characteristics represent desired capabilities beyond the year 2015. The Manta performs
as a single vehicle with an estimated battery endurance of up to 45 hours. The Manta'
s
sonar capabilities include an 85% probability of detection for a sensor width of 1400
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yards. Like the LMRS, the Manta will likely possess GPS and radio frequency
communications. The GPS cycles require about 10 minutes for each hour of operation.
The times necessary for launch and recovery of the Manta are 1 5 minutes and 1 minutes
respectively.
D. SYSTEM COMPOSITION
This analysis compares combinations of two LMRS vehicles, six REMUS
vehicles, and one MANTA vehicle. Optimized SMAMT measures a combination's
effectiveness. This study excludes comparison of a system of six REMUS vehicles
operating alone because REMUS does not possess the endurance to conduct searches of
appreciable size in distant SZs. The following list contains the combinations of vehicle




Full System of two LMRS vehicles, six REMUS vehicles, and one MANTA,
2. Two LMRS vehicles,
3. One MANTA vehicle,
4. Two LMRS vehicles supported by six REMUS vehicles,
5. One MANTA vehicle supported by six REMUS vehicles, and
6. Two LMRS vehicles and one MANTA vehicle.
E. MiRSA MODEL STATISTICS
A Pentium III 450 MHz personal computer with 64MB of RAM executes the
MiRSA model using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) (Brooke et al.
1997) and the XA: Profession Linear Programming System Solver (Sunset Software
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Technology 1993). The most complex MiRSA model with the full system of composite
architectures consists of only 61 equations, 21 continuous variables, and 32 binary
variables. All the model runs achieve an optimal solution in less than one minute except
the 100% search level, which achieves a solution in under five minutes.
F. FIXED-SIZE ELEMENTAL SEARCH AREA (ESA) MiRSA RESULTS
Fixed-size ESA MiRSA executions for the Straits of Hormuz for search levels of
63%, and 70-95% (at five percent increments) result in the SMAMTs listed in Table 5. A
plot of SMAMTs versus desired search level produces curves useful in comparing
different combinations of vehicles (Figure 8).
At all search levels, the full system requires the least SMAMT. Specifically, at a
63% search level, the full system completes a search of the SMA in approximately 71
hours. This result is expected because it employs all the available assets. By contrast, the
Manta requires the most time, completing its searches in 193 hours.
% Search % Confidence LMRS + LMRS + MANTA
+
Level Level FULL LMRS MANTA MANTA REMUS REMUS
63% 95.00% 70.84 111.51 193.38 70.84 108.97 141.40
70% 97.00% 69.72 112.78 194.41 69.72 110.13 142.13
75% 98.50% 91.68 151.83 246.02 91.68 111.47 193.38
80% 99.20% 89.84 155.04 293.53 89.84 118.90 241.76
85% 99.60% 91.12 196.88 297.71 113.00 153.15 241.23
90% 99.90% 110.21 234.26 299.21 152.10 155.79 246.23
95% 99.99% 121.63 241.20 344.06 153.63 238.47 246.52
* All suspected minefield area mission times listed in hours.
Table 5. Fixed-Size Elemental Search Area (ESA) MiRSA Suspected Minefield Area Mission
Times (SMAMTs)
Fixed-size elemental search area MiRSA results for the Straits of Hormuz with search levels assuming
values of 63%, and 70-95% at five percent increments. At a 63% search level, the full system completes
searching the entire SMA in 70.84 hours. The LMRS and Manta system performs equally well, completing
its search in the same amount of time. At a 95% search level, differentiation between the different
combinations is more noticeable.
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The composite system including two LMRS vehicles and the Manta vehicle
provides SMAMTs equivalent to the full system at all search levels less than 85% and a
26% increase at the 95% search level. At search levels of 80% and lower, the LMRS' and
Manta' s sufficiently wide ESAs enable timely search completion of the SMA. The
addition of the REMUS vehicles at these lower search levels provides no additional
-e— FULL —s— LMRS
-©— LMRS + MANTA —B— LMRS + REMUS
A— MANTA











63% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95%
Desired Search Level
Figure 8. Fixed-Size Elemental Search Area (ESA) MiRSA Optimized Suspected
Minefield Area Mission Time (SMAMT) Curves
With the fixed-size elemental search area implementation of MiRSA, the LMRS and Manta
combined system performs as well as the full system for search levels below 85%. However,
REMUS reduces mission times when operating with the LMRS at moderate (75-90 %) search
levels, and when operating with Manta at any search level.
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benefit. At search levels greater than 80%, narrower search lane separation reduces the
ESA widths of the LMRS and Manta vehicles such that REMUS searches provide a
significant benefit.
Low search levels (63-70 %) possess sufficiently large ESA widths so the LMRS
can survey the entire SMA without the need for REMUS. At the 95% search level, the
composite LMRS and REMUS system demonstrates performance equivalent to LMRS.
REMUS' contribution when working with the Manta significantly reduces optimized
SMAMTs at all search levels.
G. VARIABLE-SIZE ELEMENTAL SEARCH AREA (ESA) MiRSA RESULTS
Variable-size ESA MiRSA executions for the Straits of Hormuz at 63%, and 70-
100% at five percent increments result in the SMAMTs listed in Table 6. A plot of
SMAMTs versus desired search level produces curves useful in comparing different
combinations of vehicles (Figure 9).
% Search
%
Confidence LMRS + LMRS + MANTA +
Level Level FULL LMRS MANTA MANTA REMUS REMUS
63% 94.93% 46.53 90.69 129.89 51.82 77.98 99.22
70% 97.30% 53.20 98.99 143.32 57.02 88.99 110.82
75% 98.44% 60.07 118.63 167.54 65.62 96.19 133.29
80% 99.20% 65.82 131.18 195.72 71.91 103.48 157.72
85% 99.66% 75.55 160.37 213.72 87.80 130.65 173.16
90% 99.90% 84.92 184.14 239.66 98.69 149.31 190.64
95% 99.99% 103.73 222.39 297.69 124.48 182.28 239.01
100% 100.00% 384.06 794.43 1003.97 436.10 644.05 780.41
Table 6. Variable-size Elemental Search Area (ESA) MiRSA Suspected Minefield
Area Mission Times (SMAMTs)
Implementation of the variable-size ESA version of MiRSA for varying search levels results in the
SMAMTs listed above. The full system comprised of two LMRS vehicles, six REMUS vehicles, and one
Manta at a 63% search level (-95% confidence level) requires only 46.53 hours to search the 262 square
nautical miles of the Straits of Hormuz and 384.06 hours for an exhaustive search. Manta operating alone

















63% 70% 75% 80% 85%
Desired Search Level
90% 95%
Figure 9. Variable-size Elemental Search Area (ESA) MiRSA Optimized
Suspected Minefield Area Mission Time (SMAMT) Curves
SMAMT results for composite systems remain consistent with results from the fixed-size
ESA MiRSA model. Variable-size ESAs reduce the amount of excess area searched for each
SZ. Because significantly more time is required at the 100% search level (Table 6), the 100%
search level results are not shown above.
The result remains consistent with the fixed-size ESA MiRSA model. However,
implementing variable-size ESAs reduces the amount of excess area searched for each SZ.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The value of a mixed integer-linear programming approach is twofold. The MiRSA
model provides a tool for rapidly assessing the benefit of employing combinations of
varying UUV architectures. In addition, for a specific scenario and available UUV
architectures, MiRSA model results provide tactical commanders with a decision-aid for
assigning UUVs to mine detection operations. The MiRSA model's simplifying
assumptions include constant UUV performance for a given SZ and allowed simultaneous
UUV launches. The additional time associated with launch and recovery of multiple
UUVs are small in comparison to the overall time required to search the entire SMA.
Lastly, by assuming fairly uniform ESA widths for each UUV and each SZ, the MiRSA
model executes in under five minutes for all scenarios considered.
MiRSA finds two LMRS vehicles can complete a 95% confidence level search of
the Straits of Hormuz in 91 hours and the Manta vehicle requires nearly 130 hours. If two
vehicle architectures are available, the two LMRS vehicles with Manta employed together
require only 52 hours. When only the LRMS or the Manta is to be operated with the
REMUS vehicles, MiRSA finds the LMRS and REMUS combined system requires 78
hours while the Manta and REMUS combined system requires 100 hours. Employing two
LMRS vehicles, six REMUS vehicles, and Manta together finish the search in 47 hours.
Exhaustive search requires no gaps between search lanes and a sharp increase in
search time. Two LMRS vehicles require 794 hours to conduct an exhaustive search; the
Manta vehicle requires 1,004 hours. The two LMRS vehicles with Manta employed
together require only 436 hours. Employing two LMRS vehicles with REMUS requires
35
644 hours, employing the Manta vehicle with REMUS requires 780 hours, all three UUV
architectures, employed together, finish the search in 384 hours.
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